



As the intense debate over definition demonstrates,
corruption refers to a broad range of behavior. Nor-
mally defined as the abuse of public power for per-
sonal gain (Nye 1967), most equate corruption with
bribery, where an illegal payment is made to a gov-
ernment official in return for some type of official,
state-sanctioned, authoritative act that has a selective
and tangible impact and that in the absence of the
secret payment would not otherwise have been made
(Johnston 2005, 18). But beyond bribery, corruption
also includes kickbacks which operate much like a
bribe, but where the illegal payment is made after the
service is rendered,usually from a portion of the gov-
ernmental award itself,and extortion where the public
official threatens to use (or abuse) state power to
induce the payment of a bribe.While such acts involve
transactions between citizen and government official,
corruption also includes graft and  embezzlement,
where public officials act alone to appropriate public
funds or divert their use. Closely related to graft,
fraud refers to the various, often complex and imagi-
native schemes orchestrated by officials to appropri-
ate public funds,often with civilian accomplices.These
may include establishing fake companies,listing ghost
workers to pad payrolls, overbilling the government
on contracts,or otherwise fixing the books to hide the
disappearance of public funds. Beyond these acts
commonly associated with corruption,corruption also
encompasses such diverse activities as nepotism, fa-
voritism and conflict of interest, where public-sector
jobs or benefits are illegally channeled to family,
friends or to the benefit of the decision-makers own in-
terests. Even within the partisan and electoral realms,
corruption encompasses a range of activities such as
illegal campaign contributions, illegal expenditures,elec-
toral fraud and vote buying.
Despite a largely methodologically-driven tendency
in the literature to create and utilize one standard
measure of something called corruption, numerous
scholars have peered inside the broad concept to dif-
ferentiate and identify distinct types and forms of
corruption. Differences center on the participants in-
volved in a corrupt act,the types of norms the act vio-
lates, the nature of the transaction, the broader con-
text within which the act occurs and the purpose,out-
come or motive of the act. Such analytical distinc-
tions are not only important in developing a better
understanding of the phenomenon, but are also cru-
cial in exploring the causes and consequences of cor-
ruption and in crafting strategies to fight it.This essay
presents some of the classificatory schemes, illus-
trates their use in theory and discusses some of the
on-going theoretical and methodological challenges.
Types of corruption  
Institutional location of the actor and norms
Whereas by definition political corruption involves
“public officials” – thereby differentiating the con-
cept from fraud taking place within society – the
sheer vastness of the public sector means that cor-
ruption can occur at virtually any place within the
government.An easy means of differentiating forms
of corruption centers on the institutional location of
the public official involved (i.e., corruption within
the executive branch, the legislature or the judiciary,
the local government, the police, customs agents,
building inspectors, etc.). Two broad categories of
corruption based on institutional location include
“upper-level” and “lower-level” corruption.The for-
mer involves presidents, ministers, members of the
legislature, governors and other high-ranking offi-
cials,while lower-level corruption relates to civil ser-
vants.The upper-level/ lower-level distinction largely
parallels differences based on the distinct political
roles or functions of the public officials and the
norms governing their behavior. The term “political
corruption” thus tends to refer to corruption occur-
ring at the policymaking stage or,in Eastonian terms,
the input side of the political system, whereas “bu-
reaucratic” or “administrative” corruption relates to
CESifo DICE Report 2/2011 10
Forum
* Middle Tennessee State University.CESifo DICE Report 2/2011 11
Forum
the implementation of policy carried out by lower-
level officials or the output side of the equation
(Bardhan 2006; Scott 1972). Because of their differ-
ent functions within the system, these two forms of
corruption also violate different norms.“Bureaucra-
tic corruption” involves the violation of first-order
norms (the written rules and laws that are the prod-
uct of politicians’ decision making), whereas “politi-
cal corruption” committed by policymakers entails
the violation of more nebulous second-order norms
(the often unwritten guidelines determining how po-
liticians should make decisions, such as impartiality
and fairness;Warren 2004).
The nature of the transaction
A second taxonomic approach differentiates corrup-
tion based on certain characteristics of the transac-
tion. A number of schemes have been developed
along these lines.One rather simple approach relates
to the direction of corrupt influence. It draws a dis-
tinction between “bribery” and “extortion”. In bri-
bery, societal interests use extra-legal payments or
bribes to influence the content of state policy or its
implementation. At a broader, more systemic level,
this form of corrupt influence can take on the char-
acteristics of “state capture”, whereby an entire
agency or institution operates on behalf of societal
interests.Extortion,by contrast,involves the use and
abuse of state power by public officials to demand
extra-legal payments or rents in return for providing
a legitimate or illegitimate service. In extortion, the
direction of influence moves from state to society,
while bribery reverses the direction. It is quite dif-
ferent when drug traffickers have half the police on
their payroll doing their bidding versus when the
police shake down petty thieves or extort “bribes”
from citizens for real or imagined offenses.
A second and more elaborate approach based on
aspects of the corrupt transaction is offered by Syed
Alatas (1990, cited in Heywood 1997, 425–26). He
distinguishes six forms of corruption. “Transactive”
corruption involves the mutual arrangement be-
tween a donor and a recipient; “extortive” corrup-
tion implies some form of compulsion usually harm-
ing a party; “defensive” corruption refers to the act
the victim of extortion is compelled to engage in;
“investive”corruption involves an act with no imme-
diate payoff, but an understanding of a favor some-
times in the future; “nepotistic”corruption relates to
family members being appointed to positions in the
government;“autogenic” corruption entails one per-
son acting alone with no official-citizen exchange;
and “supportive” corruption refers to acts designed
to protect and strengthen existing corruption.
A third approach based on characteristics of the
transaction is essentially a typology based on the rel-
ative size and frequency of the acts. This distinction
is commonly expressed in terms of “grand” versus
“petty” corruption. At one end, “grand corruption”
involves large sums of money and usually less fre-
quent transactions,while at the other end “petty cor-
ruption” refers to smaller and more routine pay-
ments.This distinction tends to parallel those rooted
in the institutional position of the state official in-
volved,with “grand corruption”more likely to occur
among high level government officials who have lim-
ited interaction with the public, while “petty corrup-
tion” tends to take place among low-level, bureau-
cratic workers who regularly interact with the public.
Systemic framework
Though somewhat related to differences based on size
and frequency,distinctions are also often based on the
broader pattern of corruption within the system.This
approach focuses not just on the individual corrupt
act, but rather on the context in which the act occurs.
Mark Robinson (1988), for example, identifies three
forms of corruption: “incidental” corruption, which is
confined to malfeasance on the part of the individual
and is thus rare;“institutional”corruption referring to
certain institutions that may be riddled with corrup-
tion due largely to the absence of controls; and “sys-
temic” corruption which reflects situations where cor-
ruption is deeply entrenched and pervasive through-
out society.A similar sort of distinction contrasts “cen-
tralized” and “decentralized” corruption depending
on the level of control exercised by the political elite
over local officials (Bardhan 2006,344).This approach
tends to parallel other distinctions as well.Institution-
al, systemic and centralized corruption, for instance,
usually involves elaborate webs and chains of illegal
payoffs inside government, often to the benefit of su-
periors or the political party.
Motive or purpose  
A final approach distinguishes types of corruption
based on the motives,purpose or outcome of the cor-
rupt act. The range, of course, can be rather exten-
sive. Does the corrupt act – for example, allowing a
murderer to go free – result in the diversion of mil-
lions of dollars from a program designed to help thepoor or simply in speeding up the award of a license
that would have been granted in time anyway? One
easy distinction based on motive separates corruption
that promotes purely personal interests from corrup-
tion that benefits a clique,a political party or an insti-
tution which may be more systematic. In a discussion
of the link between organized crime and corruption,
for instance, Margaret Beare (1997, 161–69) offers a
non-exhaustive taxonomy of corruption based largely
on motive or outcome. She identifies four types:
“bribes/kickbacks”,which are paid or demanded in re-
turn for being allowed to do legitimate business;“elec-
tion/campaign corruption”, designed to ensure con-
tinuing influence; “protection corruption”, payments
in exchange for being allowed to engage in illegiti-
mate business; and “systemic top-down corruption”,
where the nation’s wealth is systematically siphoned-
off by the ruling elites.
Theoretical linkages and methodological challenges 
Identifying different forms of corruption – whether
based on the institutional location of the partici-
pants,the norms,the nature of the transaction or the
underlying motives – is useful largely to the extent
that it advances our theoretical understanding of cor-
ruption (Gerring 1999). Recognizing different forms
of corruption, in short, leads to a series of questions:
To what extent do the various types of corruption ac-
tually go together? Do all forms of corruption stem
from the same underlying causes or are the different
types of corruption caused by different factors? Do
the different forms of corruption have different af-
fects on society or the political system? 
Much of the corruption literature exploring the un-
derlying causes and consequences of corruption fail
to differentiate forms of corruption. Corruption, in
other words, is treated generically as a singular class
of political behavior. This is especially true of the
bulk of the quantitative, cross-national studies be-
cause of the way corruption is normally measured.
On the one hand, an argument can be made that po-
litical corruption of any stripe facilitates all or other
types of corruption and/or that all types of corrup-
tion stem from similar causes. Factors, such as per-
missiveness or tolerance, the lack of trust or social
capital or even the lack of democracy, for instance,
would seem to feed bureaucratic corruption as well
as political corruption, bribery as well as extortion,
corruption within the police, the judiciary, the par-
ties, ad infinitum. Indeed, formal models show that
corrupt activity generally depends on how much cor-
rupt activity is taking place throughout society, sug-
gesting a common pattern (Bardhan 2006, Mishra
2006). Such an assertion that leads to grouping dif-
ferent forms of corruption together not only justifies
the use of crude, composite measures of the phe-
nomenon but it also sustains the search for a com-
mon set of causal factors and unified or one-dimen-
sional consequences.
On the other hand, a wide range of theories suggest
that different forms of corruption may not necessar-
ily go together and that certain factors may relate
only to certain types of corruption and not others.
Mocan (2004) and Morris (2008), for instance, find
weak and limited correlations linking perceptions of
corruption from actual involvement in paying bribes
or being asked to pay a bribe,particularly among de-
veloping countries. Mocan (2004), for example, finds
that when the quality of the institution (measured by
the risk of expropriation) is controlled for, the weak
association between corruption and corruption per-
ception actually disappears. Taking a different ap-
proach, Bardhan (2006) distinguishes bureaucratic
from political corruption and finds that at least in the
case of the United States,the two do not go together
and that the United States suffers high levels of
political corruption, but low levels of bureaucratic
corruption.
Michael Johnston’s (2005) work on corruption syn-
dromes,in turn,highlights different causes for differ-
ent patterns of corruption. Casting the balance of
economic opportunities and political opportunities,
weak or strong state and civil society as key causal
agents, Johnston identifies four syndromes of corrup-
tion – interest group bidding, elite hegemony, frag-
mented patronage and patronage machines – that dif-
fer in terms of the underlying causal agents, the pat-
terns or forms of corruption within the society, in the
consequences for the political system, and hence on
the approaches needed to curb corruption. In a com-
parison of corruption in Latin America, Daniel
Gingerich (2009) similarly links different types of pro-
portional representation electoral systems to distinct
classes of corruption.The open-list, proportional rep-
resentation (PR) system found in Brazil tends to cre-
ate strong incentives for legislators to amass a per-
sonal following by distributing pork and private goods
to supporters back home via, in part, corruption. But
while the open-list PR system in Brazil feeds individ-
ual schemes of corruption to pay for expensive per-
sonal election campaigns, the closed-list PR system
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found in Argentina and Bolivia fosters a different pat-
tern of corruption,where the power of the party elite,
coupled with a more politicized bureaucracy, pushes
party leaders to strike deals with bureaucrats and
channel public resources to help the party.
Tying different forms of corruption to different con-
sequences,Morris (1991) links broad forms of corrup-
tion to political outcome.Focusing on Mexico,I argue
that while extortion can help solidify the elite and
enhance centralized control,bribery tends to have the
opposite effect, undermining elite unity and political
stability.In a similar way,Mushtaq Khan (1998) shows
how different forms of corruption can have different
economic outcomes. Specifically, he demonstrates
that the corruption found in Korea created strong
incentives for the state to re-allocate rights and re-
sources in a way that maximized economic growth,
while the type of corruption prevalent in South Asian
countries enriched political intermediaries and thus
tended to undermine economic growth.
A somewhat different theoretical approach links dis-
tinct forms of corruption to different perceptions of
the seriousness or level of corruptness by elite and
the public.One of the earliest explorations of this by
Arnold Heidenheimer (1970) relates the perception
of corruptness to the nature of obligations within so-
ciety. In a similar approach using opinion data, John
Peters and Susan Welch (1978) find that acts involv-
ing a non-political official (judge rather than politi-
cian), a public role (rather than private citizen), do-
nations from constituents rather than non-con-
stituents and large payoffs tend to be deemed more
serious.A more recent study in France by Lascoumes
and Tomescu-Hatto (2008) also gauges the level of
corruption for a range of different corrupt acts.This
enables the researchers to distinguish four groups of
citizens based on their different perceptions of the
degree of tolerance for certain acts of favoritism (con-
demn or not) and overall perception of the extent of
corruption among public officials.
Much of the difficulties in studying different forms
of corruption are methodological. Despite the nu-
merous taxonomies and typologies developed by
analysts,we still lack the tools to adequately measure
the different classes of corruption. To date, Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Perception In-
dex stands as the most frequent measure used in em-
pirical work exploring the causes or consequences of
corruption. This indicator, however, is one-dimen-
sional and does not differentiate among types or
forms of corruption (Johnston 2005, 19). While im-
portant in advancing the study,the use of crude,one-
dimensional measures of corruption cannot really
address questions related to the different types of
corruption. It may not be enough simply to say that
a county suffers extensive or systemic corruption, or
to expect the same causal factors to lie behind all
forms of corruption or for all to exert a similar im-
pact. Unfortunately at this stage, this may be all that
standardized measures of corruption can tell us and
all that we can learn from a global perspective.
Though still relying on perceptions as measured
through opinion polls, Transparency International’s
more elaborate Corruption Barometer does differ-
entiate corruption by institutional location.This pro-
vides an important methodological tool to differenti-
ate countries based not only on the overall level of
corruption, but different patterns of corruption. Part
of the theoretical challenge, of course, is to use this
data to test and refine theories differentiating cause
and consequence, moving the study beyond its one-
dimensional focus.
Conclusion
Clearly corruption encompasses a wide range of be-
havior.As discussed, analysts have identified a num-
ber of subcategories or forms of corruption, some of
which are more commonly employed than others.
Among the criteria most commonly used to draw
distinctions are: the institutional location and func-
tion of the public official involved (“political corrup-
tion” versus “bureaucratic corruption”), the direc-
tion of influence (“bribery” versus “extortion”), and
the size and frequency of the transaction (“grand
corruption” versus “petty corruption”). But despite
these and other efforts to tease out different forms
of corruption,understanding the relationship among
the classes of corruption, their determinants and
their consequences continues to confront both theo-
retical and methodological challenges.
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